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This chapter explores how algorithms produce aesthetic forms and 
dystopian configurations across Palestinian cyber and digital spaces. 
Through surveillance and erasure, algorithms operate as 
infrastructures of (in)visibility on social media, digital maps, 
navigation apps, and augmented reality video-games. On the one 
hand, they serve the Israeli system of control by making Palestinian 
users and contents hyper-visible to surveillance. On the other, by 
imposing (self-)censorship and erasure from digital representations, 
they ultimately purport to delete Palestine from cyber spaces. Acting 
at the threshold of the (in)visible, algorithms do not only enact control 
and surveillance, but they also inform the creation of an aesthetics of 
disappearance. In this light, this chapter problematizes the normative 
assumption equating invisibility – in the form of masking or 
disconnection – to freedom and emancipation by introducing the 
concept of aesthetics by algorithms as new canon and form of 







In October 2017, the Israeli police arrested a Palestinian 
carpenter who posted online a selfie taken while working in a 
construction site in the illegal Jewish settlement of Beitar Ilit, 
near Jerusalem. The picture portrayed the man posing in front 
of a bulldozer and was accompanied by the caption ‘Good 
Morning’ in Arabic. Facebook’s automated service mistakenly 
translated the man’s message into ‘attack them’ in Hebrew, 
and ‘hurt them’ in English. Besides the wrong translation, Israeli 
algorithms ignited the security procedure also because they 
detected a bulldozer, which have in the past been used for hit-
and-run attacks. Once notified of the post, the Judea and 
Samaria District police proceeded to the arrest, as no Arab-
speaking officer had been involved in the operation and could 
promptly detect the fallacious translation.  
 
Besides revealing the extent of algorithmic interference in 
Palestinian life, this anecdote reveals how algorithms are 
trained to learn, codify, manipulate and make visible human 
behaviors, as well as tendencies, with the aim of transforming 
them into informed and targeted strategies of control. A 
common line of critique pointing at algorithmic surveillance is 
that these have made individuals hyper-visible to the eye of 
sovereign, and thus convey to invisibility – in the form of 
anonymity, ‘masking’, or even disconnection – a transformative 




This chapter expands the debate on visibility and 
algorithmic surveillance by addressing the question of 
colonial erasure and algorithmic power in the context of 
Israel/Palestine. It does so by drawing inspiration from 
Sari Hanafi´s definition of the erasure of Palestinian 
national space during and following the 1948 Nakba as 
spacio-cide. According to Hanafi, spacio-cide is not only a 
matter of seizure, control, or division of the Palestinian 
space per se, but of its abolition.  Accordingly, we argue 
that algorithms operate in occupied Palestine as tools of 
government that create an infrastructure of concealment, 
making the cyberspace as an additional layer of spacio-
cide. By keeping the analysis within the aesthetic realm, 
we consider those liminal spaces generated by digital 
experiences where the threshold between visibility and 
invisibility gets thinner, and impacts the visibility of 
Palestinian cyber and digital spaces.  
 
By addressing how algorithms and software contribute to 
make Palestinian digital spaces (in)visible, our analysis 
concentrates on the way this happens through the 
production of images and visual representations of space. 
Along these lines, this chapter argues that algorithms do 
not only last as ultimate expressions of colonial power 
through control and surveillance, but contribute to shape 
its very aesthetics. By acting as agents of order of 
4 
 
Palestinian life, they give further configurations to its 
erasure from both real and digital worlds. At the threshold 
of visibility, algorithms thus inform an aesthetics of 
appearance and disappearance, that operates by 
increasing Palestinian’s visibility to the sovereign, while 





Algorithms as infrastructures of the (in)visible 
 
(In)visibility traditionally connects to the global history of 
infrastructure, and its relation with power and the sovereign. 
In the history of the modern state formation, for example, such 
relation has always been central to strategies of population 
management, and to the ways technologies could make 
citizens and subjects more visible, legible, and hence 
predictable. Overall, from the railways to communications and 
information technology, infrastructural power always stood as 
a symbol of the human desire to make the world visible. In that 
sense, Orit Halpern suggests that the realm of the visible 
cannot be reduced to the sole sphere of the sensible, but it 
needs to be understood as an operation: the ‘visible’ 
constitutes in fact ‘an assemblage of relationships, 
enunciations, epistemologies, and properties that render 




In this framework, today’s communication and information 
technologies continue bringing radical changes to the ways 
people are made ‘visible’, as learning machines, algorithms and 
software can shape, intercept, and even manipulate, social and 
political orders across the globe.ii These are designed to 
accumulate large amounts of data that, once processed 
through mathematical calculation and averaging, synthesize 
human behaviors and patterns into aggregated and workable 
coordinates.iii Precisely, this algorithmic modeling then 
rationalizes the collected data by producing an abstract and 
partial ordering of reality, producing systems of government 
that, in the long run, value and shape individuals’ realities and 
consequently social order by increasing individualization, de-
territorialization, while decreasing transparency and 
accountability.iv 
 
As different algorithmic models cross-integrate their data to 
produce individual or collective user profiles, they purports to 
reduce disordered and messy, yet plural, human experiences 
into a homogenous and systematized ‘algorithmic life.’v 
Through mathematical ordering, in fact, algorithms operate on 
‘what has been done’  but also towards unknown futures: as 
much as individual habits and inclinations crystallize into 
averaged mass ones, they create the possibility to track and 
influence historical futures and human actions. As a 
consequence of the ‘datafication’ of most facets of human 
experience, algorithms have become autonomous actors of 
power. In the sphere of social media, for instance, this has 
created a problematic imbalance between humans and 
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machines: users’ inability to decipher how algorithms work, 
and when/whether these are at work.  
 
Due to their increasing complexity - in adaptability, automatic 
functions, and extent of analyzed data - algorithms become 
increasingly undetectable and invisible to users. In contrast, 
this very sophistication makes users’ behaviors, experiences, 
and inclinations inescapable to the sight of machines. Users 
unconsciously participate to algorithmic-based operations by 
feeding data to the machine, and hence becoming ‘willing’ 
targets of the algorithm. Such relationality in fact exists as the 
interactive production of machines’ knowledge through 
encounters with human inputs. In such a way, users embed 
their experiences into circular models of algorithmic designvi. In 
this scenario, the illusion for users to decide freely, somehow 
strengthen the functioning of algorithmic-based power and 
ordering.  Overall, by targeting the ‘as-yet-unknown’, 
algorithms and software dig deeply into an underground world 
and, simultaneously selecting and singling out human 
inclinations, they operate at the threshold of the visible, the 
known, and the possible. 
 
In this chapter we argue that such apparatus of producing 
evidence and ordering, if applied to the settler colonial context 
of Israel/Palestine, offers a further degree of analysis to 
understand  that the relation between infrastructural power 
and invisibility is not limited to the question of control and 
government through ‘making visible’, but it expands to the 
question of colonial erasure. With the Nakba and the 
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foundation of the state of Israel in 1948, 750.000 Palestinian 
refugees lost their homes and lands, while over 600 villages had 
been destroyed. Since then, the Israeli state has progressively 
implemented segregation and the systematic erasure (physical, 
social, political and cultural) of Palestinians from their land. 
From the 1967 war, and the military occupation of the West 
Bank and the Golan Heights, through the First Intifada and the 
Oslo Accords in 1993, to the construction of the separation wall 
and the siege of the Gaza strip across the 2000s, Israel has 
created a complex spatial and infrastructural grid made of 
refugee camps, borders, barriers, network of roads, 
checkpoints, military outposts and settlements that 
disarticulate, dispossess, occupy, and destroy the Palestinian 
living space. These are the elements that enforces Israel’s 
settler colonial project and the invisibility of Palestinians.  
 
In this context, we explore the ways algorithmic infrastructures 
set an additional layer of Israel system of power: juxtaposing to 
the physical world, cyber and digital spaces serve as the 
ultimate milieu where Palestinian life is forced into invisibility. 
Interestingly, this manifests in a twofold direction. On one 
hand, as the Israeli system of control, policing, and rhetoric of 
‘hunting terrorists’ demands the hypervisibility of its targets, it 
also corresponds to the forced disappearance of resistant 
Palestinian usership from cyberspace through punishment or 
as a form of self-censorship to escape surveillance. On the 
other, symbols of the colonial apparatus and its dispossession 
(such as refugee camps, seams, and borders) are erased from 
digital maps and spatial representations, further stretching the 
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The hyper-visible of algorithmic surveillance 
 
As an infrastructure of visibility and control, surveillance 
represents a traditional feature of modern state formation.viii 
Through algorithmic automation, strategies of control have 
further accelerated the transition towards what Gilles Deleuze 
defined, already in 1992, as the ‘society of control’ix. 
Scholarship on surveillance overall agrees that the so-called 
‘dataveillance’x marked a discontinuity with the past by leveling 
the ‘hierarchies of visibility, with all individuals subject to the 
eye of the machine regardless of their social status, race, 
gender, etc. At times where even the sovereign falls under the 
spotlight of surveillance, going invisible – through anonymity or 
disconnection – represents thus the ultimate resort to protect 
one’s privacy.xi  
 
This acceleration is visible in Palestine more than anywhere 
else. If making Palestinian life hyper-visible through invasive 
surveillance dates back, and even precedes, the foundation of 
the State of Israel,xii algorithmic surveillance enhanced this 
system of control and marked the final stage where Palestinian 
reality turns into a dystopia. Above all, the pervasiveness of the 
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Israeli system of control depends on the total control on the 
infrastructure. In contravention of Oslo I (1993), that set forth 
a progressive transition of the ICT governance to the PA, 
internet backbone and service delivery infrastructures 
currently remain under full Israeli control for the entire 
territory - East Jerusalem, West Bank, and the Gaza Stripxiii. In 
addition, Israeli system of control - including national agencies, 
ISPs, algorithms, software, and even the Palestinian Authority 
(PA)xiv- polices the visibility of Palestinians’ contents. Before 
anything else, Israel’s government of the (in)visible operates 
through service access denial, hence hindering the possibility 
for many Palestinians to even produce visual contents.  
 
Besides being an effect of the violation of the Palestinian right 
to internet access, censorship primarily occurs through Israeli 
policing of contents, primarily justified on security groundsxv. In 
the logic of predictive policing, which grounds its operationality 
on intelligence knowledge and predictions, Israeli authorities 
developed algorithms and software specifically tasked with the 
scanning of Palestinian online activities. As These algorithms 
lack transparency and are thus not available for scrutiny.xvi 
Investigative research and media reports point however to 
some of their features. Israeli algorithmic surveillance scans 
social media contents - texts (statuses, notes, comments), 
videos, and images - in search for data constituting an 
‘incitement to violence’. Filtering a number of coded Arabic 
words - such as ‘martyr’, ‘Al-Aqsa’, ‘jihad’, ‘knife’ and more - 
algorithms collect and combine data about individuals in order 
to predict their propensity to commit a violent crime (as in the 
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case of the above-mentioned bulldozer selfie). This dystopian 
functioning led to the arrest of more than five hundred 
Palestinians since 2017.xvii  
 
In 2015, Palestinian poet Dareen Tatour wrote and published 
the poem ‘Resist my people, resist them’ (Qawem Ya Shaabi 
Qawemahum). Shared on her Facebook profile page - as well 
as through a YouTube video combining the poem text with 
short video-cuts of Palestinians clashing with the IDF in the 
West Bank - the poem was flagged by Special Units of the IDF. 
Tatour’s house was stormed by the Israeli police, she was 
arrested and charged with incitement to violence and terrorism 
against the State of Israel. She was imprisoned for 97 days, 
before she was released on house arrest in January 2016. In 
2019, after three and half years of persecutions, the district 
court in Nazareth accepted her appeal and acquitted her from 
all the charges related to the publication of the poem. Clearly, 
her initial punishment was commensurate to her decision – as 
happens to many Palestinians - to make her voice visible, 
denouncing the violence and injustice of the Israeli oppression. 
Like her, many other men and women have been detained 
because of contents shared on social media or instant 
messaging apps, that was indiscriminately flagged as 
‘dangerous imminent threat’.  Palestinian human and digital 
rights organizations (such as 7amleh and the Palestinian Centre 
for Human Rights) have been reporting how Israeli algorithms 
filter contents – such as journal articles, and political 
statements – that criticize Israeli occupation without any direct 
reference to violencexviii. There, algorithms work as online 
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checkpoints, filtering contents and reporting them to 
authorities in the event these are perceived as worth of 
attention. 
 
The notorious 1956 sci-fi story of Philip K. Dick, The Minority 
Report seems having entered the real world of Palestine, or 
vice versa. Imagining a dystopian future that warns of the risk 
of dangerous liaison between political power and digital 
authoritarianism, Dick tells the story of a special division of the 
police called Precrime that arrest suspects before they can 
commit any actual crimes. As if we were trapped in the 
imagination of a sci-fi novelist, algorithms are designed to make 
contents and identities visible to the sovereign. Being visible 
online comes with greater risks for Palestinians. Cyberspace 
can quickly turn into an unsafe space, that strangely mimics the 
prison space: prisoner in fact cannot speak, write, and share. 
Not surprisingly, digital rights activists and dissidents in 
Palestine more and more imitating the techniques that political 
prisoners use with encoded messages to communicate 
internally and externally to the prison - to stay visible, to exist.  
 
Furthermore, with Israeli algorithms set on a high-level guard, 
too often Palestinians are pushed into self-censorship – to 
disconnect - this way contributing to the representation of a 
digital space polished off their presence. Too often, however, 
disconnecting is not enough for protection. In order to profile 
users, algorithmic surveillance feeds on data of different nature 
and sourcing/confidentiality. In 2014, for instance, forty-three 
agents of the Israeli intelligence (part of the elite Unit 8200) 
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undisclosed evidence revealing the Unit’s reliance on invasive 
hacking software to acquire private data of Palestinian usersxix. 
Targeting and blackmailing particularly vulnerable categories - 
such as women or LGBT people - the Unit trades the secrecy of 
their personal data in exchange for information of relevance for 
the intelligence, in a sort of state-sponsored phishing. In this 
sense, the aesthetic intervention does not only remove 
Palestinian contents, but intimidate most vulnerable categories 
pushing them into self-censorship and disappearance.  
 
The Palestinian case reminds us of how algorithms are not just 
repressive in the way they intercept and censor (or lead to self-
censorship). In the context of social media, they influence 
likeability or, on the contrary, they can function as vectors of 
hate and discrimination. At the same time, as proven by the 
case of Dareen Tatour, the technique of making Palestinians 
hyper-visible on the internet has revealed to be a double-edge 
sword for the state of Israel. In denunciation of Tatour’s case, 
the Israeli minister of culture Miri Regev re-posted Tatour’s 
poem in order to expose her publicly to the web. Regev meant 
to stir hatred, and make her a target, but interestingly, this had 
somehow an opposite effect, as it only led to the poem gaining 
more notoriety and popularity, creating the basis for new 
transnational networks of solidarity for Dareen. By doing so, 
this visibility put the Israeli state under the spotlight, stirring 
the attention around other similar cases in the world where 
freedoms of artists and poets are under attack.xx 
 




Unravelling tensions and fluctuations between visible and 
invisible raises questions that, going beyond surveillance and 
coloniality, relate to representation and political aesthetics. By 
operating at the limit of the visible, algorithms set the ground 
for an aesthetics of (in)visibility. Through the systematization 
of this visible, we argue that their systemic ordering subtends 
an aesthetic ‘of the limit’, that we here define an aesthetics by 
algorithms. 
 
Programmers have since long tried to define and capture the 
‘beauty’ of algorithms in aesthetic canons. terms of 
compactness, eloquence, and ‘cleanness’, as these aesthetics 
qualities are deemed to be crucial for the ordering and 
problem-solving functions of algorithmsxxi. Art theory and 
criticism has similarly explored the relationship between 
algorithms and aesthetics in order to formalize systems and 
viewpointsxxii. This chapter shifts perspective from the orderly 
qualities of algorithms to the aesthetics ordering performed by 
algorithms in Palestinian digital spaces. In Israel/Palestine an 
aesthetics by algorithms is set by making Palestinians hyper-
visible targets of surveillance and control. 
 
As proven by the techniques implemented online by activists 
and dissidents, also the resistance against oppressive 
algorithmic power, belongs to the sphere of (in)visibility. 
Activists therefore adopt themselves invisibility, as the only 
mean to escape repression and be safe. Hence, both state data 
visualizations and dissident speech and practice engages with 
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those representational elements that define an aesthetics by 
algorithms. Overall, it becomes clear how the epistemic 
function of algorithms determines generally an understanding 
of reality that reflects how knowledge opaquely can mutate 
into operationalizable outputs. In this light, to speak of an 
aesthetics by algorithms implies to speak of an aesthetics of 
opacity, where both power and counter-powers are deeply 
immerged.  
 
In this sense, opacity is indeed the foundational principle. This 
furthermore develops and expands on multiple levels, by 
determining various conventions and canons. Here we list a 
series of principles that in our view set the foundational aspects 
of the aesthetics by algorithms: 1) algorithms and software act 
at the threshold of (in)visibility; 2) in so doing, their growing 
autonomy corresponds to a lower degree of detectability; 3) 
the opacity of mechanic and interactive learning serves and 
perpetrates the bias and partiality of sovereign power; 3) while 
operating as agents of order, classification, and prediction, 
algorithms validate decentralization in power structures, 
moving  at the edges of transparency.xxiii Entangled in 
algorithms’ inner tension between opacity and ordering, 
algorithms and software can emerge as semi-independent 
actorsxxiv; 4) They interchangeably make visible or invisible their 
targets of subjects of interest. 
 
Around those principles we argue that it is possible to theorize 
the basis of an aesthetics by algorithms as an order of the 
(in)visible. There, designers, lawmakers, military, algorithms, 
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self-learning algorithms, users and dissidents (and many other 
actors) play – more or less directly – a crucial role. Grounded 
on such vast network of actors, an aesthetics by algorithms 
serves an important epistemic function: by operating at the 
intersection between digital and real worlds it explains the 
relation between aesthetics and politics. In line with the 
thought of Jacques Rancière xxv, the aesthetics by algorithms 
does not correspond to the aestheticization of politicsxxvi. 
Instead, it constitutes canons or a ‘system of a priori forms’ that 
determines a ‘delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible 
and the invisible, of speech and noise, that simultaneously 
determines the place and the stakes of politics as a form of 
experience’xxvii. In this sense, it pertains to the very foundation 
of politics, and as Rancière explains, as something that equally 
and necessarily ‘revolves around what is seen and what can be 
said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent 





The invisible of colonial algorithms 
 
Whereas Israeli algorithmic surveillance primarily operates by 
making Palestinians hyper-visible, the ultimate goal of this 
colonial system of control is annihilation, deletion, and 
disappearance.  With social media platforms emerging as most 
important spatial containers of individuals’ visual contents - 
texts, audios, videos, and more - their absence, removal, or 
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disappearance also pertain to the visual representation of 
these spaces and to the aesthetic experiences conveyed. From 
this perspective, Israel’s strategy of governing the visible 
encompasses the policing and censorship of contents on social 
media platforms. Therefore, Israel’ attempt of making 
Palestinians visible and legible online, is a way to make them 
vulnerable. By juxtaposing the digital to the physical space, 
algorithmic power in fact epitomizes a very typical colonial 
paradox: the colonized is simultaneously ‘annihilated’ and 
‘preserved’, as he/she is instrumental to keep intact the social, 
economic and racial hierarchy imposed by colonizers and 
settlers.xxix  
 
In addition to online policing and censoring through 
dataveillance (and the reaction/resistance to it), another 
foundational aspect of an aesthetic by algorithms is grounded 
on data visualization. As Wendy Chun has explained, algorithms 
are designed to make the complexities of the global world 
mappable, transforming ‘time-based interactions and intervals’ 
into spatial networks and visual representations.xxx In this 
sense, these representational pursuits create an ‘illustration’ 
that conflates the local and global dimensions through the 
reduction of the world into digital nodes and edges. These 
representational elements provide us with the possibility to 
think of an aesthetics by algorithms in terms of ‘maps’ or 
‘atlases’ of such networks, where the visual and aesthetic 





In their book Objectivity, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison 
(2007) highlight how those XVI century atlases of science, 
geography, anatomy, or astronomy, were designed to map the 
territory of the power they served. Similarly, algorithms 
embody a dictionary of the science of the visible, whose 
masters learn to ‘see’ the world in new ways. More than those 
atlases, big data offer a broader dimension to the bird-eye 
culture where ‘seeing from the air’ interconnects to 
horizontality, allowing for a better comprehension/capture of 
the world constitutive objects. There, the space of play of 
algorithms illustrates nodes and edges that do not simply 
create a network, but make politics, where things, people, or 
experiences are deliberately made visible or invisible, non-
existent and despised. The visualization aspect, constitute 
indeed another milestone of an aesthetics by algorithms. 
According to Halpern, in fact, ‘visualization came to define 
bringing that which is not already present into sight’: 
visualizations, according to current definition, make new 
relationships appear and produce new objects and spaces for 
action and speculation”xxxi. Specific to the context of 
Israel/Palestine, it is important to note that ‘map-making 
practices were always entangled with contradictory spatial 
identities and imbalanced power resources. xxxii  
 
In that sense, making the Palestinian (in)visible was not only a 
question of ordering and control, but also one of legitimization 
of the Zionist project and state formation. As outlined at the 
beginning of this chapter, since 1948 and the Nakba (which 
starts with the expulsion of Palestinian from their lands and the 
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erasure of more of 600 villages), Israeli power has been 
systematically entangled to mapping as a form of spacio-
cide.xxxiii After 1967, Israel made the occupation increasingly 
invisible, trying to normalize its sovereignty in East Jerusalem, 
the West Bank, and Gaza.xxxiv This strategy of erasure concerns 
different domains and practices, such as cartographic 
renaming, removal, and place-making. While the West Bank 
became ‘Judea and Samaria’ on Israeli official maps  (thus 
drawing a connection between the state of Israel and biblical 
times), the Green Line (1967 armistice line) progressively 
disappeared from visual representations in a way that ‘reif[ied] 
the erasure of borders (...) between Israel’s territory and the 
regions it had captured’.xxxv  
 
Between 1967 and the First Intifada (1987–1993), the Israeli 
government favored illegal settlements construction, as it 
‘served, among other things, to erase the Green Line in the 
[settlers’] own minds as well as in the minds of the citizens 
within Israel’ (Ib.). Questions of borders reappeared in Israeli 
public discourse in the aftermath of the Second Intifada (2000–
2005) in times when the construction of the separation wall - 
85% of which runs east of the Green Line in Palestinian territory 
– and digital mapping developed contiguously. Despite a 
number of exceptionsxxxvi, the digitalization of maps occurred in 
line with the Israeli cartographic tradition of keeping the Green 
Line and many spatial products of the occupation (the 




Alongside the opening of mapping to a wider usership, 
algorithms and software failed to put existing power structures 
into question through a disruptive aesthetic intervention. 
Rather, as shown in this chapter, they continue to retrace and 
amplify its patterns and logics. Since the earliest stages of its 
implementation, Google Maps (GM) has generated a number 
of controversies regarding its (non) representation of the 
physical and political realities of Palestine. At a first glance, the 
absence on GM of any of the conventional nomenclatures 
(Palestine, State of Palestine, Palestinian Territory, etc.).  
immediately signals erasure.xxxvii Besides sparkling protests, this 
‘forgetfulness’ led to the 2013 DNS hack conducted by five 
Palestinian hackers who re-directed Google’s Palestinian 
homepage (www.google.ps) to a site displaying a correct 
version of the map. Protests furthered in 2016 when the labels 
West Bank and Gaza Strip suddenly disappeared on GM. 
Regarding this incident, a Google’s spokeswoman swiftly 
attributed the removal to a bug in the software’s algorithm, 
hence putting the lack of accountability and opacity of the 
algorithms to an instrumental end. Zooming in the map, 
another act of erasure reveals: several Palestinian villages in 
the Area C of the West Bank, as well as Naqab desert  non-
recognized Bedouin villages, are absent. At the same time, GM 
reports in full detail the network of illegal Israeli settlements in 
East Jerusalem and the West Bank, hence normalizing their 
presence also in digital representations.  
 
With regards to digital representations of Palestinian spaces, 
augmented reality (AR) video-gaming corroborates the 
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argument presented in this chapter. As soon as Pokémon Go 
was released available in Israel/Palestine, it became 
immediately clear how the images of the game embodied the 
detachment between real and virtual in its spatial 
representation.xxxviii The application of augmented reality (AR) 
technologies to gaming purports in fact to create playable 
experiences at the intersection of real and virtual worlds. 
Adding a virtual layer onto the actual world enables 
experiences that exceed the boundaries of both worlds 
through the creation of hyper-realities. But the integration of 
different worlds becomes problematic when spaces, politics, 
and histories are assembled and reproduced in rarified ways, in 
contrast to the complexities on the ground. In a context like 
Palestine, overlaying a virtual world over a divided space can 
lead to further contestation.  
 
In line with the tradition of those maps and cartography 
keeping the Green Line invisible from Israel’s visual 
representations, the AR map not only erases the Green Line, 
but it also makes spatial and symbolic products of colonial 
oppression disappear. Abstracting space into generic 
emptiness and void, PG provides players with a depopulated 
and neutralized image of East Jerusalem and the Palestinian 
Occupied territories, emptied of the images of the Nakba and 
the 1967 occupation. Refugee camps, together with the 
separation wall, borders, and other spatial components of the 
Israeli occupation are made simply invisible. This way, by 
erasing the visual tropes of Israeli infrastructural power, PG 
embodies the operational as well as symbolic/aesthetic 
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features of the colonial status quo, thus further stretching 
Hanafi’s argument spacio-cide to virtual/augmented reality. 
Not as negation of the physical, rather as its completion, AR 
intervenes offering a digital representation of Palestinian land 
that deliberately cancels the spatial products of the Nakba and 
the occupation (in addition to military, civil, and judicial 
powers). 
 
Making Palestine invisible in cyber and digital spaces  not only 
constitute a representational issue related to place-making and 
the visualization of spacio-cide. Serving as referential input for 
the software’s calculation of routes and navigation advice, this 
removal also impacts users experience in terms of mobility. For 
example, the absence of Palestine in GM means that its 
algorithms are unable to calculate routes between Palestinian 
villages, in the West Bank and from/to East Jerusalem. In those 
cases where data are available - such as for the route between 
Ramallah and Bethlehem – GM algorithms advise users to pass 
through East Jerusalem. As most Palestinian residents are 
denied access to their capital since 2000, the software does not 
only make Palestine substantially invisible but, by ignoring 
Israeli-imposed restrictions, excludes large sections of 
Palestinian usership from the service. xxxix In other words, 
following a exclusionary logic, GM algorithms assume that 
users are not Palestinians, making them invisible again. 
Whenever navigating through Palestinian areas of the West 
Bank, a warning indicates that roads have a ‘restricted usage’, 
while no such security alert appears in proximity of Israeli 
checkpoints or settlements.xl In fact, settlers can plan their 
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journey from one illegal settlement to another, indicating 
preferential, fast, and secure routes for their travel.   
 
Whereas the epistemic function of GM rests on a very limited 
interaction between users and software, other digital services 
draw their maps and routes through the acquisition of 
extensive user data.xli For this very feature, the Israeli-
developed navigation app Waze praises itself for allowing users 
to participate in the making of maps, navigation, and ultimately 
space.xlii One of Waze’s distinctive features consists in 
generating navigation guidance on the basis of drivers’ 
crowdsourced information, also in real time. Most distinctively, 
Waze algorithms fulfill their epistemic function in two different 
ways. First, besides traditional turn-by-turn vоісе nаvіgаtіоn, 
rеаl-tіmе info on traffic, or location-specific аlеrtѕ, they acquire 
anonymized іnfоrmаtіоn regarding users’ behaviors, such as 
speed averages and driving habits. Second, users contribute to 
expanding the database by reporting map errors, temporary 
disruptions (such as accidents, roadblocks, etc.) and other 
feedbacks related to their driving experience. But, a user 
knowledge-based functioning, can cause unpredictable and 
controversial outcomes that can shake the status quo, 
becoming an issue for the Israeli authority.  
 
In 2015, during the so-called Intifada Al Quds, Waze suddenly 
came to be at the center of the Israeli public debate. The 
application wrongfully featured certain areas of East Jerusalem 
(Silwan and Wadi Al Joz) as Areas A or B of the West Bank, and 
thus advised Israeli drivers not to access these ‘danger 
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zones’.xliii The Israeli mayor’s vigorous protests promptly 
addressed Waze’s CEO with the claim that these areas stand 
within Jerusalem municipal boundaries, and thus under full 
Israeli control. Further sparkling Israeli criticism, in 2016 Waze 
algorithms erroneously advised   a military vehicle of the Israeli 
Defense Forces (IDF) to access the Qalandiah refugee camp, 
situated between Jerusalem and Ramallah.xliv.The use of heavy 
force and destruction from the Israeli army to rescue the 
soldiers caused the murder of one Palestinian. Following the 
event, IDF officials criticized Waze and its software for changing 
‘facts on the ground’ and putting the life of Israelis at risk. In 
order to address these representational loopholes, Israeli 
military accompanied Waze’s representatives for a field tour 
across the West Bank in 2017. This cooperation instantly 
generated an immediate map update: since then, Waze does 
not indicate any routes to those travelers that intends to drive 
into the Palestinian territory. Ruling out that users might be 
Palestinians wanting to travel across the West Bank, Waze 
unilaterally embed its navigation directions to the strategy of 
Israel’s military needs, exercising a sort of technological 
redlining that de facto excludes Palestinians. When drivers now 
approach any ‘confusing’ point close to Palestinian controlled 
Area A, the navigation software issues a generic warning 
indicating the proximity of a dangerous area: ‘Can’t find a way 
there’ or ‘Caution: This destination is in a high risk area or is 
prohibited to Israelis by law’.xlv 
 
When algorithms seldom unstitch networks of power through 
knowledge acquired autonomously, sovereign power 
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intervenes to stitch them back. In recent years, Palestinians 
have stood up against their disappearance and developed 
alternative navigation services, such as Maps.me and Doroob 
Navigator. These services do not only help Palestinian drivers 
to deal with the ever-changing rules, checkpoint traffic, or to 
avoid Israeli settlements. By doing so, they address outstanding 
epistemic questions of visual justice, where Palestinian mobility 
and trajectories are visible, and the spatial products of Israeli 
occupation are also kept visible - against the attempted 
normalization of oppression in the app-worlds. 
  
Epilogue - In defense of visibility  
 
The repression of Palestinian dissent via algorithmic 
technologies is obviously not the only case that features online 
repression by state actors. Since social media has become a 
new space for data collection and mapping, also data 
visualization has become crucial to state apparatuses of 
surveillance worldwide. Overall, with the eye of surveillance 
becoming seemingly unescapable, activists and critical 
scholarship have increasingly embraced practices and 
discourses of ‘disconnection’ on the belief that invisibility 
produces empowerment.xlvi  
 
This chapter has shown this is not enough in colonial contexts 
where invisibility is the ultimate goal of the sovereign. In 
Israel/Palestine, algorithms and software operate in a context 
where different layers of power overlap, juxtapose, and 
interconnects. Our analysis primarily reveals how this 
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contextual complexity affect algorithms’ epistemic operations 
in ways that advance the Israel’s government of the (in)visible 
through erasure, silencing, and bias. On one hand, this 
evidence strongly puts into question those tenets that strongly 
emphasize the emancipatory potential of technology, both in 
academia as well as across digital rights advocacy. On the other 
hand, algorithms’ autonomy – intrinsic to their epistemic 
function – also reveals software’s ability to put power 
structures into question. In this sense, their political agency 
mainly unfolds through the tension between the ordering and 
disordering of networks.  
 
Albeit different, our two cases also point at a number of 
considerations related to the complex relationship between 
aesthetics, politics, and technology.  While digital maps reveal 
how, through visual representations, people’s political life is 
affected, the censoring and erasure of contents indicate the 
way in which the very interruption of political life also depends 
on questions of aesthetics and visual representations. Studying 
the digital nodes and edges of an aesthetics by algorithms, 
implies understanding the many ways algorithmic power 
through digital images, visualization and their ordering 
strengthen (or construct) oppressive realities and injustice.  For 
this reason, the aesthetics by algorithms approach allows to 
register this tension in relation to geopolitical transformations, 
historical change, or the absence/neutralization of both. In line 
with Rancière theorizing, our aesthetics by algorithms indicates 
that – in contrast with those governance trends that purports 
to depoliticize users’ life through technology – visual 
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representations nevertheless unmask ‘the perverse 
commandeering of politics by a will to art, by a consideration 
of the people qua work of art’. From this perspective, there 
exists an ineluctable aesthetic core to political life that 
configures as a ‘delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible 
and the invisible, of speech and noise, that simultaneously 
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